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Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates,




In Labine v. Vincent,1 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a Louisiana law which barred a publicly
acknowledged illegitimate child from sharing with collateral rela-
tives in the estate of his intestate father.2 The state succession
law survived attack from both due process and equal protection
arguments. Stated briefly, Labine held that state intestacy legisla-
tion was peculiarly of state concern. A state could validly make
rules to protect and strengthen family life, as well as regulate the
disposition of intestate property. By logical extension, Labine
would hold that a state could distinguish between the inheritance
rights of the illegitimate and legitimate child from their father.
3
Nearly all states permit an illegitimate child to inherit from or
*BA, 1966, Wilkes College; J.D., 1969, Dickinson School of Law; mem-
ber of Pennsylvania Bar; staff attorney with Luzerne County Legal Services
Association, Inc.
1. 91 S.Ct 1017 (1971).
2. Id. at 1018, 1020-21. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
3. The facts of Labine involved a contest between an illegitimate
child and collateral heirs over the proper distribution of the estate of the
deceased father of the child. But, both the opening sentences of the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in Labine considered the broader implica-
tions of whether a state could properly distinguish between the inheritance
rights of illegitimate and legitimate children. Id. at 1018, 1022.
through the maternal line.4 But, any relaxation of an illegitimate's
common law disability from inheritance must depend on statutory
grace.5 In the absence of legislation, an illegitimate is still not per-
mitted to inherit from or through the paternal line.0 A few states
completely bar an illegitimate from inheriting from his father.
7
Other states permit an illegitimate to inherit from his father in
limited situations where proof of paternity is established," or
where inheritance follows under local law after the father has
acknowledged the illegitimate child as his own.9 Only three states
have abrogated any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children for purposes of inheritance."'
Recently, equal protection and due process arguments have
been raised to challenge state legislation which discriminates
against the illegitimate child. The initial wedge which provided
this constitutional attack was Levy v. Louisiana,1 and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.12 Levy invalidated
a Louisiana statute which denied an illegitimate a right of recovery
under wrongful death legislation for the tortious death of his
mother.13 Conversely, Glona invalidated the same statute which
4. A survey of 50 states may be found in Note, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV.
45 (1961). A listing is also found in Knause, Bringing The Bastard Into the
Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REV.
829 (1966).
5. 10 Am. JuR. 2d Bastards § 146 (1963).
6. Id.
7. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 113, §§ 904, 905 (1935); HAWAII REV. STATS.
§ 577-14 (1968); Ky. REV. STATS. § 391.090 (1969); PA. STATS. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 1.7 (1950).
8. E.g., IND. STATS. § 6-207 (1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-234 (Supp.
1964); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (Supp. 1970).
9. CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (1961); COLO. REV. STATS. § 153-2-8 (1963);
FLA. STATS. ANN. § 731-29 (1964); IDAHO CODE § 14-104 (1948); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.222 (1964); KANS. STATS. ANN. § 59-501 (1964); MINN. STATS.
ANN. § 525.172 (1969); MONT. REV. CODE § 91-404 (1947); NEB. REV. STATS.
§ 30-109 (1964); NEV. REV. STATS. § 134.170 (1967); N.M. STATS. REV.
§ 29-1-18 (1953); N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUST L. § 4-12 (McKinney
1967); OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (1970); S.D. COMP. LAWS tit. 29-
1-15 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-10 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 11-04-080
(1951); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (Supp. 1970).
10. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206A (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01.05
(1969); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 111.231, 109.060 (1957).
11. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
12. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
13. LA. CIV. CODE ART. 2315 (West 1970):
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense
or quasi offense is a property right which, on the death of the
obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, sub-
ject to the community rights of the surviving spouse.
The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense
or quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a
period of one year from the death of deceased in favor of: (1) the
surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either
such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father and
mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or
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had been interpreted to deny a mother a wrongful death recovery
for loss of an illegitimate child.' 4 Commentators on Levy and
Glona correctly presaged the subsequent broad case attack on state
legislation regarding the illegitimate child.15
Levy and Glona were undoubtedly successful in modifying cur-
rent state rules regarding the illegitimate child in the areas of
wrongful death,' support," and even inheritance.' 8  Labine, how-
ever, is clearly a temporary setback, but the widely split five-four
decision will undoubtedly be raised again.' 9 This is particularly
true since Labine can easily be charged with the "inexact analysis"
and "analytical deficiencies" which plagued Levy and Glona.
20
child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the
deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent sur-
viving. The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives
may also recover the damages which they sustained through the
wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover damages under
the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which,
on the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action sur-
vived, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs,
whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not.
As used in this article the words "child," "brother," "sister,"
"father," and "mother" include a child, brother, sister, father, and
mother, by adoption, respectively.
14. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 68, 74 n.3 (1968).
15. Gray and Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate:
Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co., 118 U. PA. L.R. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gray]; Krause, Legiti-
mate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on
Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 338 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Knause].
16. E.g., Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969); Armijo
v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d 16, 440 P.2d 471 (1968).
17. R. v. R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968). See note 48 infra and ac-
companying text.
18. Citing Levy, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a state
statute denying the right of an illegitimate child to inherit from his mother
was unconstitutional in Michaelsen v. Undhjem, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D.
1968). See note 58 infra and accompanying text. Following this decision,
the state legislature of North Dakota removed any distinction between the
legitimate and illegitimate child for inheritance purposes from either the
natural mother or natural father. N.D. CENr. CoDE § 56-01.05 (1969).
19. Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in Labine v. Vincent, 91
S.Ct 1017 (1971), does not preclude a state court from interpreting a local
inheritance statute favorably to the illegitimate child. E.g., Michaelsen v.
Undhjem, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968). We shall discover that the majority
opinion in the 5-4 Labine decision is difficult to support when rationally
dissected. The hope is, naturally, that the issue will be raised again in the
federal courts. But, the analysis to be presented in this Article can be
fruitfully applied by local courts.
20. The quoted remarks where made of the decisions of Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968) in Knause, supra note 15, at 342. The dissenting opinion
in Labine attacks the majority opinion for its failure to analyze or refusal
This Article will first examine the Levy and Glona decisions.
Those cases and their progency were the basis for direct constitu-
tional challenge of the illegitimate child's plight under intestacy
legislation in Labine. Labine will be thoroughly reviewed. Sup-
porting reasons for the result reached by Labine will be specifically
detailed to determine whether a proper basis exists for the result
reached by Labine.
II. LEVY AND GLONA: THE OPENING WEDGE
Levy v. Louisiana2' was a survival and wrongful death action
under Louisiana law against a physician who apparently failed to
properly diagnose and treat the fatal illness of a mother of five
illegitimate children. The state courts uniformly denied a cause of
action to the illegitimate children. 22 Glona v. American Guarantee
& Liability Insurance Co. 23 also involved the Louisiana wrongful
death statute which was the subject of Levy. In Glona the illegiti-
mate child of a Texas resident was fatally injured in an automobile
accident in Louisiana. Here, also, the courts uniformly denied a
cause of action to the mother of the deceased illegitimate child.
24
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, writing for a majority of six
in both Levy and Glona, it was generally held that the denial of tort
recovery under Louisiana law was also denial of equal protection to
illegitimate children in Levy, 25 and a similar denial to a parent of
an illegitimate child in Glona,26 In Levy it was found
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother.
These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her;
she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed
hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her
death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent
would.
We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against
them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is pos-
sibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.
27
In Glona it was held that equal protection of the laws was de-
nied the mother when wrongful death recovery was precluded
to analyze the issue before the Court. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017,
1025 (1971).
21. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
22. The facts may be found in Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Gray, supra note 15 at 2. The lower court's
dismissal of the suit was affirmed by the court of appeals. In re Vincent,
192 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 25, 193 So. 2d 530 (1966),
prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 925 (1967).
23. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
24. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab Ins. Co, 379 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 389 U.S. 969 (1967).
25. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
26. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Cas. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-6 (1968).
27. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
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merely because the mother's child was born out of wedlock. The
Court did not find substance in the contrary argument that per-
mitting recovery would encourage illegitimacy.
It would be, indeed, farfetched to assume that women have
illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in
damages for their death. A law which creates an open sea-
son on illegitimates in the area of automobile accidents
gives a windfall to tortfeasors. But it hardly has a causal
connection with the "sin," which is, we are told, the historic
reason for the disability.
2 8
Detailed analysis of either Levy and Glona would be duplica-
tive since other commentators have carefully and precisely scruti-
nized both opinions.29 There is agreement that Justice Douglas'
holding is unclear since the constitutional standard applied by the
majority for its result is not explicitly stated. At least four possi-
ble grounds can be established. First, there is the traditional con-
stitutional standard applied to economic legislation as to whether
the classification of illegitimacy bears a rational relation to the
purposes of the statute.30 Briefly stated, illegitimacy has no rela-
tion to a tortious injury whether inflicted on the mother of an
illegitimate child, or directly on the illegitimate child. 1 A second
possible ground is that the Louisiana statute encroached on basic
civil rights. The statute inhibiting recovery to illegitimates "...
involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his
parent. '32 A third ground which may invalidate the Louisiana stat-
ute is that the legislation creates a suspect classification based on
race and ancestry.33 Finally, there is a substantial due process ar-
gument available to invalidate the Louisiana statute. The legisla-
tion sought denial of recovery rights to a person34 on the basis of a
28. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Cas. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
29. Knause, supra note 15; Gray supra note 15.
30. Justice Douglas noted that great latitude is permitted legislatures
in making classifications regarding economic legislation. Levy v. Louisiana
391 U.S. 68 (1968), citing Morey v. Dodd, 354 U.S. 457, 465-466 (1959), and
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). The question was
then raised whether a corporation could be denied a right of recovery for a
wrong simply because the incorporators of the business were all bastards.
The question was not answered, except by the dissenting opinion which
labeled Justice Douglas' analogy as "far-fetched." Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 80 n.8 (1968).
31. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
32. Id. at 71.
33. Id. at 71, citing Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669
(1966), and Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1942). See Gray,
supra note 15, at 4-5.
34. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68-70 (1968):
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not
condition of illegitimacy over which the child had no control.35
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Black dissented to both Levy
and Glona in a single opinion. 6 Two reasons were given to justify
the dissenting opinion's support of the Louisiana statute. First,
there is disagreement with the majority opinion that the classifica-
tion between a legitimate and illegitimate child is "inherently sus-
pect."37 Merely because a majority of the Court could draw a bet-
ter classification does not mean the existing state classification is
unconstitutional. 8 Second, the dissent argued that a rational pur-
pose was served when a state requires the formalities of marriage
and acknowledgement of an illegitimate before wrongful death re-
covery may be permitted.
Louisiana has chosen . .. to define these classes of
proper plaintiffs in terms of their legal rather than their
biological relation to the deceased ...
The Court today, for some reason which I am at a loss to
understand, rules that the State must base its arbitrary
definition of the plaintiff class on biological rather than
legal relationships. Exactly how this makes the Louisiana
scheme even marginally more "rational" is not clear, for
neither a biological relationship nor legal acknowledge-
ment is indicative of the love or economic dependance that
may exist between two persons.39
The majority opinion in Glona answered Justice Harlan's sec-
ond argument by stating
To say that the test of equal protection should be
"legal" rather than the biological relationship is to avoid
the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily
limits the authority of the State to draw such "legal" lines
as it chooses.
40
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan's dissent possibly has some va-
lidity with respect to the fact situation in Gloria. There, the mother
who sought recovery arguably could have met the formal require-
ments of marriage important to Justice Harlan.41 In Levy, a dif-
ferent fact situation prevailed. The plaintiffs there were illegiti-
mate children who had no opportunity to comport with formality or
acknowledgement. Their disadvantage resulted solely from the
fact of illegitimate birth over which they had no control.42
"nonpersons." They are humans, live and have their being. They
are clearly "persons" within the meaning of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id. at 76.
37. The different rights accorded an illegitimate child who was ac-
knowledged and one who was not was "hardly" one of those suspect classi-
fications covered by the equal protection clause. Id. at 81.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 79.
40. Id. at 75-6.
41. Knause, supra note 15, at 343 n.24. See Glona v. Am. Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545, 546 n.2 (5th Cir. 1967).
42. This, of course, would violate substantial due process. For ex-
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Difficulty with the rationale of Levy and Glona immediately
appeared. On remand the Supreme Court of Louisiana approved
the characterization of the reasoning process of the United States
Supreme Court in Levy and Glona as "brute force. '43 Moreover,
the Louisiana court, probably by accident, assumed that Levy and
Glona applied to a parent-child setting rather than only to the
mother-child relationship found in either Levy or Glona.44 Whether
the father-child relationship is open to constitutional attack is, as ex-
pected, a major focus of post-Levy litigation.
45
III. POST-LEvY LITIGATION: CONFLICTING RESULTS
a. Support
One initial area of challenge following Levy and Glona is the
illegitimate child's right of support from his father. In Baston v.
SeaTs, 40 the Ohio Supreme Court held that in the absence of legis-
lation an illegitimate could not compel support from his father.
Baston would limit Levy only to the mother-child relationship.
Also, the marriage contract is essential to require consent of the
father to support an illegitimate child. Finally, any change in the
relationship of an illegitimate to its father is a matter for the state
legislature.
47
In R. v. R.,48 the Missouri Supreme Court reached a result con-
ample, the status of narcotics addiction could not be a criminal offense,
since addiction could be contracted involuntarily. Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968),
where the Supreme Court would not apply Robinson to a public drunk
charge. 'But, this was a 5-4 decision. The concurring opinion of Justice
White would indicate that Robinson should apply to a chronic alcoholic with
an irresistable urge to drink alcohol. 392 U.S. 514, 548-49 (1968). In
short, the facts of Powell would not lend itself to the Robinson rationale.
See note 136 infra. See also NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 123-26
(1966).
43. Levy v. Louisiana, 216 So. 2d 818, 820 (La. 1968), citing Glona v.
Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 361 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
44. The United States Supreme Court has held that, as alleged in
the petition in this case, when a parent openly and publicly recog-
nizes and accepts an illegitimate to be his or her child and the
child is dependent upon the parent, such an illegitimate is a "child"
as expressed in Civil Code Article 2315.
Id. (emphasis added). See Knause, supra note 15, at 339 n.8.
45. E.g., Bastion v. Sears, 15 Ohio 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968); R. v.
R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
46. 15 Ohio 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968). Argument in Bastion, how-
ever, preceded the decision in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See
Gray, supra note 15, at 23.
47. Bastion v. Sears, 15 Ohio 2d 166, 168, 239 N.E.2d 62, 64 (1968).
48. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
trary to the Ohio court in Baston and granted an illegitimate a right
to support from his father. The Missouri decision obviously rested
on a broader reading of Levy:
[T] he principles applied by the United States Supreme
Court would render invalid state action which produces dis-
crimination between legitimate and illegitimate children
insofar as the right to compel support by his father is
concerned .... 49
Analytically, the Missouri court is correct. Limiting the Levy
opinion only to the mother-child relationship is not the real issue.
As stated by a leading authority on the illegitimate:
[A]n illegitimate's claim against his father does not rest
on an analogy to his claim against his mother. Rather, it
rests on comparison with the legitimate child's rights
against his father, and, more specifically, on the answer to
the question whether 'legislation denying to the illegitimate
rights [against his father] that are granted to those of
legitimate birth is . . . related to proper public concern
with respect to which legitimate and illegitimate children
are not situated similarly.'5 0
b. Wrongful death actions
The immediate preceding analysis is supported by Schmoll v.
Creecy.5 1 There, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered
whether illegitimate children could bring a wrongful death action
for loss of their father. The New Jersey wrongful death statute
referred to the state's intestacy statute to determine the "benefici-
aries" of a wrongful death recovery. The intestacy statute did not
permit an illegitimate to inherit from or through the father unless
the child was legitimated during the father's lifetime. The New
Jersey court found it impossible to determine whether the thesis of
the United States Supreme Court in Levy and Glona applied to in-
testate devolution.5 2 This was not pivotal, however, since the
wrongful death statute merely referred to the intestacy statute to
identify beneficiaries in the tort action. Despite this reference,
Schmoll found that claimants take under the wrongful death stat-
ute, not the intestacy legislation. The court found that
legitimacy is irrelevant to the tortfeasor's liability, and
hence it is invidious to grant a remedy to the legitimate
and withhold it from the illegitimate child. Under that
49. Id. at 154. See also Munn v. Munn, 450 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1969);
Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Family Ct. 1969).
50. Knause, supra note 15, at 340-41.
51. 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d at 523 (1969).
52. Id. at 200, 254 A.2d at 528.
53. No satisfying explanation by the court is given for this sleight-of-
hand. See also Knause, supra note 15, at 551 n.50a. But see In re Estate of
Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sur. Ct. Kings Co. 1969).
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thesis, it can be of no moment whether that parent was the
mother or the father.
54
c. Proof of paternity legislation
Some states permit an illegitimate child to inherit from his
father where proof of paternity is properly established-usually dur-
ing the lifetime of the intestate.55 Litigation has considered the
difference between the status of the legitimate and illegitimate
child where the latter requires proof of paternity before inheritance
is allowed. Courts have, however, rejected an illegitimate child's
argument that he is denied equal protection by requiring proof of
paternity. Broadly stated, proof requirements are "reasonable,"
and are necessary to prevent fraudulent claims.5
d. Inheritance under intestacy legislation
Before the Supreme Court held in Labine v. Vincent57 that
states could properly limit the inheritance rights of illegitimates
under intestacy statutes, a few cases considered the same issue by
utilizing the analysis and result of Levy. The first intestacy situa-
tion to which Levy was applied was in North Dakota where an ille-
gitimate was denied a right to inherit from the mother. The state
supreme court in Michaelson v. Undhjem" held under Levy that
54. Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 201, 254 A.2d 525, 529 (1969). But
see Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971).
55. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. See also Knause, Bring-
ing The Bastard Into The Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Le-
gitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 854-56 (1966).
56. A state statute requiring an illegitimate to demonstrate proof of
heirship did not deny equal protection in Burnett v. Camden, 255 N.E.2d 650
(Ind. 1970). Similarly, to require an illegitimate child to show written
declaration of paternity was not unconstitutional. In re Estate of Pakari-
nen, 178 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1970); In re Estate of Breole, 178 N.W.2d 896
(Minn. 1970). See also In re Estate of Kirkby, 299 N.Y.S.2d (Sur. Ct. N.Y.C.
1969). And, in Tridential Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 63 Misc. 2d 1058, 314
N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term N.Y. Co. 1970), the father of two illegiti-
mate children left insurance proceeds but no named beneficiary. The fa-
ther had acknowledged in writing the fathering of the children. But,
there was no order of filiation entered in court, as required under New York
law. The insurance company interpleaded the two children and the par-
ents of the deceased. The court granted the proceeds of the policy to the
children having found no rational purpose in excluding illegitimate chil-
dren from the estate of their father. This was especially true in view of
the undisputed formal acknowledgments of paternity. See also Matter of
Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d, 163, 302 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1969).
Where the father fails to act during his lifetime, the court will not act after
death. Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198, 201 (Miss. 1971).
57. 91 S.Ct 1017 (1971).
58. 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
the local statute denying an illegitimate the right to inherit was un-
constitutional. Michaelson apparently grounded its result on a due
process principle:
Applying the reasoning in Levy, as no action, conduct, or
demeanor of the illegitimate children in the instant case is
relevant to their status of illegitimacy, we conclude that
the classification for purposes of inheritance contained in
§ 56-01-05, which is based on such status . . . is unreason-
able.59
Subsequent to Michaelson, the state legislature of North Da-
kota passed an intestacy statute which removed all distinction be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children.6 0
Other courts have not been as generous as North Dakota when
reviewing the constitutionality of intestacy legislation where the
illegitimate child is concerned. In Pettiford v. Frazier,6 1 an illegiti-
mate child appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia from a lower
court order that she was not entitled to inherit from the estate of
the intestate father. The state intestacy statute permitted an ille-
gitimate child to inherit only from the mother.6 2 While another
state statute permitted the father to legitimate an illegitimate
child,6 3 the father here did not comply with the statute. The state
supreme court upheld the order of the lower court. The court,
without extended discussion or even citing Levy or Glona, found
that denial of a right of inheritance did not constitute unconstitu-
tional abridgement of privileges or immunities of a United States
citizen, nor was it a denial of equal protection of the laws.
59. Id. at 878.
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01.05 (1969).
Every child is hereby declared to be the legitimate child of his
natural parents, and is entitled to support and education, to the
same extent as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. He shall
inherit from his natural parents, and from their kindred heir, lineal
and collateral.
The statute which was the subject of litigation in Michaelsen read
Every child born out of wedlock is an heir of the person who in
writing signed in the presence of a competent witness acknowl-
edges himself to be the father of such child. In all cases such child
is an heir of his mother. He inherits the father's or mother's es-
tate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as
if he had been born in lawful wedlock. He, however, does not rep-
resent his father or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of
the kindred of his father or mother, either lineal or collateral, un-
less before his death his parents shall have intermarried and his
father after such marriage shall have acknowledged him as his
child or adopted him into his family. In that case such child and
all the legitimate children in such family are considered brothers
and sisters and on the death of any one of them intestate and with-
out issue the others, subject to the rights in the estate of such de-
ceased child of the father and mother respectively, as is provided in
this code, inherit his estate as his heirs in the same manner as if all
the children had been born in wedlock. The issue of all marriages
null in law or dissolved by divorce are deemed to have been born
in wedlock.
N.D. CENT.- CODE § 56-01-05 (1960) (repealed).
61. 226 Ga. 438, 175 S.E.2d 549 (1970).
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-904 (1935).
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1935).
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Strahan v. Strahan64 was a federal diversity case where the
court sustained the constitutionality of a Louisiana intestacy stat-
ute which provided that an illegitimate child could not inherit as
against legitimate heirs from his intestate parents. The court held
the local intestacy legislation was not arbitrary or without a reason-
able basis. There was a vital state interest in the stability of land
titles which evidently would be harmed by inheritance claims of
illegitimates.
6 5
While Strahan was being litigated in a federal district court in
Louisiana, that state's court system was considering the plight of the
illegitimate child under Louisiana intestacy law in Labine v. Vin-
cent.6  There, the intestate died leaving brothers and sisters, and
an illegitimate daughter. Intestate publicly acknowledged the
daughter as his own. But, acknowledgement only resulted in a right
of support to the child from the father during his lifetime. When
the father died intestate, state law permitted brothers and sisters
to inherit to the exclusion of the acknowledged illegitimate child.6 7
The illegitimate child of intestate argued before the Louisiana
courts that the state inheritance statute was unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs claimed the statute violated equal protection and due
process guarantees since the illegitimate was denied inheritance
rights solely because of his illegitimacy. 68 The Louisiana court rec-
ognized the persuasiveness of the constitutional argument under
Levy and Glona.69 Nevertheless, the state court found these deci-
sions did not alter the state's ". . . great latitude in making classifi-
cations, so that differences and distinctions in treatment offend the
constitutional guarantees only when the variations are arbitrary
and without rational basis."70  Also, the regulation of descent and
distribution of estates are peculiarly state functions.
71
64. 304 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. La. 1969).
65. Id. at 42.
66. Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 1969).
67. See discussion of Louisiana law, id. at 450-2. See Labine v. Vin-
cent, 91 S.Ct 1017-18 (1971).
68. Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 451 (La. App. 1969).
69. Id.
70. Id., citing Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), and United States
v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
71. Id., citing United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87 (1950), and Harris
v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447 (1943). But see Labine v.
Vincent, 91 S.Ct 1017 (1971). The majority opinion in Labine would evi-
dently hold that exclusive power to regulate disposition of estates is re-
served to the states. 91 S.Ct 1017, 1021. However, the dissenting opinion
in Labine notes the following:
The only context in which this statement might have relevance
would be in the context of the question, not presented in this case,
The Louisiana court found a rational basis in the existing state
inheritance legislation since it encouraged marriage and the legiti-
macy of children. Also, reasonableness was found in the stability
of land titles which would be upset if inheritance rights were ac-
corded illegitimate children.7 2 These, the court held, were suffi-
cient reasons to disallow inheritance rights to an illegitimate child
regardless of how ". . . unfair it may be to punish innocent children
for the fault of their parents,..."3
IV. LABIx BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
A. The majority view
Following denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana, the United States Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the re-
sult of the state court in Labine v. Vincent.7 4 Justice Black wrote
the sharply divided decision. The majority opinion found that ap-
pellant's reliance on Levy and Gona was "misplaced. '75  The ra-
tionale of those recent cases would not be extended to nonapplica-
ble state intestate laws. The Court certainly realized that a state
could not distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate child
where state law allowed wrongful death recovery. But, Levy in-
volved a state-created statutory right which attempted to totally ex-
clude recovery to illegitimate children who were also injured by a
tortious act inflicted on a parent. Yet, "Levy did not say and can-
not fairly be read to say that a State can never treat an illegitimate
child differently from legitimate offspring.
' 76
Labine found that certain relationships among people are
• ..socially sanctioned, legally recognized and gives rise to various
rights and duties. ' ' 77 Some state rules regarding these relation-
ships, moreover, may be more rational than others.
But the power to make rules to establish, protect, and
strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition
of the power of Congress to regulate the devolution of property
upon the death of citizens of the various States. In such a case,
the question would indeed be whether the Constitution commits
such power exclusively to the States. It so happens that this Court,
in an opinion written by my Brother BLACK, has held that the
Constitution does not commit the power to regulate intestate suc-
cession exclusively to the States. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
643, 649 (1961) ("The fact that this [federal] law pertains to the
devolution of property does not render it invalid. Although it is
true that this is an area normally left to the States, it is not im-
mune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the Fed-
eral Government which are, as is the law here, necessary and
proper to the exercise of a delegated power.")
91 S.Ct 1017, 1025-26 n.16.
72. Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. App. 1969).
73. Id.
74. 91 S.Ct. 1017 (1971).
75. Id. at 1019.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1021.
Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there is com-
mitted by the Constitution of the United States and the
people of Louisiana to the people of that State. Absent a
specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that Legislature
not the life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from
among possible laws.
78
Further, the majority found no "insurmountable barrier" to the
illegitimate child, as in Levy, if inheritance to him were to occur.
First, the intestate could have willed one-third of his property to the
child if he had bothered to execute a will. Second, inheritance to
the child would have followed if intestate had married the mother.
Third, the intestate could have stated his intention to legitimate the
illegitimate child for inheritance purposes in his acknowledgement
of paternity.
79
Obviously, the majority did not offer any penetrating analysis
to support the state intestacy scheme. Nor were the reasons offered
by the state court in its opinion explicitly affirmed by the majority
in Labine. It may well be stated that no analysis at all was effec-
tively offered by the majority. Apparently, a state intestacy
scheme is valid simply because it is a local matter, almost regard-
less of the consequences of the scheme.
B. The dissenting view
Compared to the majority opinion, the Labine dissent wrote a
lengthy and certainly more analytical opinion under the hand of
Justice Brennan. The dissent limited its opinion to the facts before
it. The minority would clearly find discriminatory state action,
not allowed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, where a publicly acknowledged illegitimate child is
treated differently than a legitimate child under a local intestacy
scheme.8 0
The dissent found at least two grounds where the state intes-
tacy scheme discriminated against the illegitimate child. First, un-
der the civil law scheme of Louisiana's intestacy legislation, a legiti-
mate child was a "forced heir" and could not be totally excluded,
even by will, by his father. An illegitimate child, on the other
hand, was excluded from inheritance, unless the father affirma-
tively inherited the child.8 ' Second, the Louisiana descent and dis-
tribution scheme did not purport to represent the "presumed in-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1022.
81. Id. at 1023-24.
tent" of the intestate. It was clear "state action" which excluded
an illegitimate from paternal inheritance where the intestate left
other collateral relations. The state action should certainly be sub-
ject to an equal protection test of a "rational basis," which, on sev-
eral grounds, the dissent found was lacking.8 2 Under the view of
the dissent, the majority's emphasis on the state's power to pass in-
heritance laws was not the issue. If the majority were correct, any
subject of local control would be immune from control of the four-
teenth amendment. Rather, the issue is ". . . whether the State has
legislated without the invidious discrimination that is forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 3
Faced with a lack of analysis to support the majority result,84
the dissent undertook its own analysis to determine whether a ra-
tional basis existed to support the Louisiana intestacy scheme.
Several views were taken by the dissent. First, there was an iden-
tity of biological, spiritual, and family interest between the father
and both the illegitimate and legitimate child. For this reason, each
type of child should be treated the same with respect to the father.8 5
Second, the state could validly insist on certain formalities to coun-
ter proof questions and possible fraud. But, where the child is for-
mally acknowledged, as in Labine, this justification for distinction
between the legitimate and illegitimate child is not present.8 6
Third, the state may well have a valid interest in the formality
of marriage. But, the state interest in the formality of marriage is
an attempt to impose reciprocal obligations on the parties to the
marriage. Also, the formality of marriage is fully within the con-
trol of the parties to the marriage. Both elements apply to the re-
lationship of one parent to another parent. Neither element applies
to the relationship between parent and child. 7 Fourth, the Louisi-
ana scheme could be viewed as a local attempt to effectuate the gen-
eral intent of parents not to provide inheritance to an acknowledged
illegitimate child. But, even the state court, in its opinion below,
found the statutory scheme to be a furtherance of state, not private,
goals.88 One could, however, entertain the presumption that the
state descent legislation sought to implement private wishes. Yet,
certainly, a father who publicly acknowledges an illegitimate child
presumably would not balk at permitting such a child to also in-
herit from the father.8 9
82. Id. at 1029.
83. Id. at 1025.
84. Id. at 1027:
In short, the Court has not analyzed, or perhaps simply re-
fused to analyzed, Louisiana's discrimination against acknowledged
illegitimates in terms of the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1028.
87. Id.
88. Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. App. 1969).
89. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1029 (1971).
Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The dissent finally stated the central problem: the state de-
scent scheme clearly punished children for the parents' action.
There was certainly standing constitutional authority that distinc-
tions due to ancestry cannot stand.90  Also, as a matter of due
process, the illegitimate child should not be disadvantaged because
of a circumstance of birth over which he had no control.9 1 The re-
sult reached by the majority was simply affirmation of a "moral
prejudice of bygone centuries."
92
The majority in Labine does not offer a satisfying analysis
which would justify its result. Certainly, Levy and Glona pro-
vided strong indicators that attack on the illegitimate child's plight
under intestacy legislation was feasible. Some courts cited these
earlier cases to broaden the rights of the illegitimate child under
local law, including the area of descent and distribution. 3 The dis-
sent in Labine raises compelling doubts as to the continued consti-
tutionality of discriminatory legislation directed to the illegitimate
child under current intestacy legislation. By itself, the due process
issue of whether an illegitimate child can properly be punished for
the conduct of his parents by denying the child inheritance appears
unassailable. As it stands, Labine may well result in halting recent
progress achieved by some local courts concerning the awakening of
rights regarding the illegitimate child. If such a result is the prac-
tical effect of Labine, then certainly the Supreme Court could have
rested its decision on a more substantial and satisfying opinion
than we have presently.
In terms of available case law, the issue raised by Labine is
novel. The "family-unit" principle which supports the result of
that decision has been raised only recently in post-Levy litiga-
tion.94 The "family-unit" principle and its corollaries will now be
examined to determine whether possible supporting reasons for the
Labine result are sound, and can withstand further fourteenth
amendment challenge.
90. Id. at 1030.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1022.
93. E.g., Michaelsen v. Undhjem, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968). See also
notes 46-60 supra and accompanying text.
94. Constitutional objection to the illegitimate child's plight under lo-
cal legislation is novel. See notes 96-100 infra and accompanying text. The
"family-unit" principle signifies the varying state interests which has gen-
erally been cited to support treatment of the illegitimate child which is
usually more harsh in terms of legal rights than treatment accorded the
legitimate child. The state cases usually claim a valid local interest in dis-
couraging illegitimacy or encouraging marriage to justify the separate legal
status of the illegitimate child. See notes 101-09 infra and accompanying
text.
V. THm FAMILY-UNIT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Evidently, there is no case support prior to Labine which has
directly considered the constitutionality of intestate statutes which
arguably discriminate against the illegitimate child.9 5
nteresting language which at least recognizes the unfair result
of discriminatory intestate statutes may be found in Cope v. Cope.
96
There, the Supreme Court considered the validity of a Utah terri-
torial statute which provided for inheritance by an illegitimate child
from the estate of his father if proof of paternity was shown regard-
less of acknowledgement of paternity by the father.9 7 It was ar-
gued that the territorial statute conflicted with antipolygamy legis-
lation of Congress. The Supreme Court recognized that the stat-
ute was in derogation of common law and would be strictly con-
strued. But, distribution of estates and rights of succession were
exclusively questions of local concern. 8 Cope upheld the validity
95. Statements approaching a due process argument have been raised
in support proceedings. In Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 668, 71 N.Y.S.2d
797, 798 (Doam. Rel. Ct. 1947), it was stated:
Parenthetically, it may be said that to call a child illegitimate
because it was born either out of wedlock or conceived by one other
than the husband of its mother is incongruous. Certainly the child
is not at fault. Unfortunately, illegitimacy is regarded as a stigma
upon the child. The stigmatization should be applied to the mother
or to both the mother and father rather than to the child.
See also the dissenting opinion of In re Cady's Estate, 257 App. Div. 129, 12
N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dept. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 688, 23 N.E.2d
18 (1939):
[Ilf the majority are correct in their decision .... we have the
anomalous situation of the blood uncle of an illegitimate child of
his predeceased sister being entitled to inherit from such natural
nephew, but the nephew may not inherit from the uncle, even
though he be . . . the only living blood relative and the only is-
sue, legitimate or otherwise, of his mother. I do not believe that
the statutes intend such an inhuman result, whereby the one who
bears the stain of the bar sinister in all too critical society must
have imposed upon him the additional punishment of disinheri-
tance while the relative of the mother may profit by her trans-
gression.
257 App. Div. at 131-2, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
In another support case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals considered a
Kentucky judgment which obligated a Texas father to support his illegiti-
mate child. Texas law did not require a father to support his illegitimate
child. The Texas intermediate appellate court would not enforce the judg-
ment in Texas since this would deny the father equal protection of the law.
This court judgment was reversed. Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 391 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965), rev'd, 402 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1966). Knause, Equal Pro-
tection For The Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L, Rxv. 477, 484 (1967). Cf. State
ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56
(1970). Here, the failure of Wisconsin statutes to grant parental rights or
notice of hearing to putative father prior to termination of parental rights
does not violate equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. As
for the putative father, the ". . . law does not recognize him at all. .. ."
The only exception is for support purposes. Id., citing Thomas v. Childrens
Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961).
96. 137 U.S. 682 (1891).
97. Id. at 684.
98. Id. But see note 71 supra, noting a contrary view in United States
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
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of the Utah legislation and stated:
rt is true that a peculiar state of society existing at
the time this act was passed, and still existing in the Terri-
tory of Utah, renders a law of this kind much wider in its
operation than in other States and Territories; but it may
be said in defense of this act that the children embraced
by it are not responsible for this state of things, and that
it is unjust to visit upon them the consequences of their
parents' sins. To recognize the validity of the act in the na-
ture of a punishment upon the father, whose estate is thus
diverted from its natural channel, rather than upon the
child; while to hold it to be invalid is to treat the child as in
some sense an outlaw and a particeps criminis.99
Between Cope and Labine, however, few instances appear
where the inequity of discrimination against the illegitimate child is
discussed in terms which touch upon an equal protection or due
process argument. 10
A. The Family-Unit Principle: Identifying The Rationale
One commentator has listed several reasons or state "interests"
which arguably support legislation which discriminate against the
illegitimate. The state discrimination discourages promiscuity and
protects the "family unit."' 0'1 In addition, there is the problem of
uncertainty of paternity, and the favored position of the legitimate
vis-a-vis the illegitimate with regard to an actual relationship with
the father.102 An additional consideration grants weight to the fa-
ther's choice in accepting the responsibility of legitimating a child
by marriage or acknowledgement.' 0  These reasons, however, are
basically restatements of a conunon theme which seeks to encour-
age the marital state.
The "family unit" principle was certainly the heart of La-
bine. 04 It was also one reason given by the Louisiana court to jus-
99. Id. at 685 (emphasis original).
100. See note 95 supra.
101. Knause, Equal Protection For The Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. Rsv.
477, 491 (1967).
102. Id. at 489.
103. Id. at 495. See also In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d
126 (1965), where the court stated that the
overwhelming percentage of fathers of out-of-wedlock children
are not interested in their children, in recognizing them, in sup-
porting them, in legitimizing them, or especially in seeking their
custody.
104. To permit a state to deny to the illegitimate child a right to in-
herit from his father would "strengthen family life." See Labine v. Vin-
cent, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1021 (1971).
tify denial of wrongful death recovery to illegitimate children in
Levy.105 The protection of title claims is a similar state inter-
est,10 6 stated differently, but still grounded on a "family unit"
principle.
The family unit doctrine is probably the historical reason for
discrimination against the illegitimate child. He is the product of
"sin.' 11 7 The underlying sociology may well be the English belief
in strict monogamy and the church influence on marital sanctity.
08
There eventually emerged the twin "legal" fears of difficulty of
proof of the real father, and fear of fraudulent claims which would
effect estates. 109 And, as illustrated earler, this common law preju-
dice has subsequently become ingrained in our own state legisla-
tion.110
B. The Fourteenth Amendment: A Basic Examination
Before applying fourteenth amendment scrutiny to intestacy
legislation regarding the illegitimate child,"' it is appropriate to
outline certain basic tenents.
Historically, the fourteenth amendment was a necessary re-
sponse to certain Reconstruction legislation which otherwise might
have a dubious constitutional foundation. A two-fold purpose has
been ascribed to the amendment. First, certain basic civil rights
were most probably the immediate object of the amendment's pas-
sage. Second, the general language of the amendment could also
encompass a broader elastic application of the amendment to a
changing social order."
2
Of course, some disparate treatment of persons is inevitable as
no absolute equality in application of law is possible. The consti-
tutional requirement is that the classification is reasonable.
1" 3
105. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 80 (1968).
106. Strahan v. Strahan, 304 F. Supp. 40, 42 (W.D. La. 1969), citing
American Land Co v. Zeiss, 219 U.S 47 (1910); Succession of Vincent, 229
So. 2d 449, 452 (La. App. 1969).
107. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S 73, 75 (1968). See
generally Note, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 47 (1961).
108. Note, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45, 47 (1961).
109. Id., citing 1 B"CKSrON, COMMENTARIES 455 (1845 ed. Chitty).
See also Knause, Protection For The Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 477, 498-
500 (1967).
110. See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
111. See text at p. 398 infra.
112. Note, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1069 (1969), citing Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 59-63
(1955).
113. But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
F.S. Foyster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Mere classifi-
cation itself, however, does not deprive a group of equal protection. Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Equal protection, though, does not re-
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And, there are certain "natural" classifications such as age and sex
which will be upheld when related to a proper legislative pur-
pose. 14 Beyond these natural classifications, other classifications
will be upheld when there factors are present. First, the classi-
fication itself is a rational one having a reasonable relation to the
object of the legislation. Second, the purpose of the classification
must be geared to a proper legislative purpose. Third, within each
class all persons must be treated equally.11
One commentary states the following general rule with regard
to application of equal protection in economic and tax legislation:
When taxation or regulation of economic activity is all that
is involved, a state has wide discretion in assessing the
problems to be dealt with and in deciding what classifica-
tions are reasonable. Unless it is "palpably arbitrary," a
classification is likely to be upheld, and if any state of facts
which would sustain the classification's rationality can be
reasonably conceived, its existence must be assumed. In-
deed, a permissive approach which does not require every
classification to be drawn with mathematical nicety seems
a practical necessity if the process of legislation is not to be
hopelessly stymied."1
A classification may also be objectionable if there is "under-in-
clusion" or "over-inclusion." A legislative classification must bene-
fit or burden all those who are similarly situated." 7 If a statute
benefits or burdens only a portion of those persons similarly situ-
ated it is "under-inclusive.""l 8  The logical complement of "under-
quire equality in law where inequality in fact exists. Special burdens may
be imposed upon defined classes for permissible ends. Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
114. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting work-
ing hours for women). See generally 16 AM. Jun. 2d Constitutional Law
§ 507-516 (1964).
115. See note 113 supra. See generally 16A. C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 489 (1956).
116. Note, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065, 1083 (1969).
117. Id. at 1084-1085.
118. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), a state
statute permitted compulsory sterilization of recidivists of certain crimes.
The list of crimes included larceny, but not embezzlement. The Court
struck down the statute since no rational distinction between the two cited
crimes warranted the difference in treatment. But see Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927). See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (ad-
ministrative convenience would not justify inexactness). In Rinaldi, a "re-
imbursement" statute required jailed but successful appellants to pay the
state for furnished transcripts. The same statute did not apply to those who
were fined, placed on probation or given suspended sentences. The statute
was under-inclusive. The policy of reimbursement bore no relation to the
dissimilar treatment.
inclusion" is "over-inclusion." Here, the statute not only includes
all those similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the stat-
ute, but other persons not so similarly situated are also benefited
or burdened by the statute. 119
The "reasonable" classification test, however, does not apply
where certain "suspect" classifications are the object of legislation.
With respect to race, 120 ancestry,1 2 1 and alienage,1 2 the classifica-
tion requires more than a rational relation to the purpose of the
legislation. For example, in Korematsu v. United States"23 emer-
gency World War II legislation which ordered Japanese-Ameri-
cans removed from the West Coast was immediately "suspect" and
subject to "rigid scrutiny." Probably, this particular legislation
was upheld solely because of wartime exigency. Similarly, an
"overriding statutory purpose""24 appears required where racial
classifications are applied. Moreover, while economic legislation
may enjoy a certain presumption of validity, the reverse is true
where "suspect" classifications exist."
5
119. An unconstitutional bill of attainder was found in United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). There, it was a criminal offense for a member
of the Communist Party to serve as an officer of a labor union. The statute
was too narrow in defining the class, and too broad in treating all members
of a class alike. Id. at 464 (dissenting opinion). The "inclusion" principles
are also due process standards of "exactness" required, when possible, in
legislation. Aptheker v. Sec. of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510-12 (1964).
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when that end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S 479, 488 (1960) (invalidating state statute requir-
ing teachers in state schools to file affidavits of organizational associations).
Further examples are Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S 147
(1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S 444 (1942).
120. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v.
Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. Herabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). See note 161
infra and accompanying text.
122. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
123. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
124. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (statute prescrib-
ing punishment for interracial co-habitation held invalid).
125. No rational factors can be assumed to uphold classifications based
on race or ancestry which are arbitrary per se. Such classifications must be
necessary. Id. But see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943),
where wartime exigency evidently upheld World War II curfew orders
which applied to persons of Japanese ancestry. Rules affecting a basic civil
right are strictly reviewed. Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669
(1966). Stated differently, in suspect or fundamental areas, a "compel-
ling state interest" must support classifications. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts:
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 M3cH L. REV. 645 (1963). See
also Brief of Amicus Curiae and American Civil Liberties Union, at
3, Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017 (1971).
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Not only are certain classifications "suspect," but recent cases
have denominated certain classifications as involving "fundamen-
tal"1 26 interests. These "fundamental" interests include voting,
127
procreation, 12  criminal procedural rights,
2  and education. 130
Since "fundamental" interests are found in rather sporadic fashion,
it is not easy to discern any common theme. It is clear, however,
that, as with "suspect" classifications, legislation which impinges on
a "fundamental" interest will fall in the absence of a compelling
state interest.'3 ' A balancing test evidently is applied.
[U]nder the fundamental interest theory a classification
may be held invalid even though it is not invidious and
even though it is reasonably related to a legitimate public
purpose. A court applying this theory will weigh the bene-
fits flowing from pursuit of the state's objective against
the detriments resulting from the impairment of a basic
personal interest. If the state's objective is not important
enough to justify impairment of the individual's interest,
the classification will fall. Here the focus is on the injustice
created by unwarranted state interference with a funda-
mental interest at least as strongly as on the injustice en-
gendered by inequality.
18 2
In summary, a classification must be reasonable, bear a sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation and treat equally all
those within the classification. Whether the classification is "un-
der-inclusive" or "over-inclusive" is a factor. A classification is
treated more strictly, however, where a "suspect" classification is
present. Finally, a classification bearing on a "fundamental" in-
terest must survive balancing the interest which is impinged against
the objective of the legislation.
In addition to equal protection, a substantive due process prin-
ciple is also important when considering legislation regarding the il-
legitimate child.133 A law should not deny a person a right based on
126. Note, 82 HARv. L. RLv. 1065, 1127-31 (1969).
127. Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
128. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See note 118 supra.
Similarly, there is the ". . . importance and nature of the decision to marry."
Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct 1017, 1030-31 (1971) (dissenting opinion), citing
Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S.Ct 780 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held that
indigent plaintiffs could not be precluded from filing divorce actions for
lack of funds to pay court and advertising costs.
129. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
130. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is more
difficult to tag certain educational interests as "fundamental" without some
racial concern. Note, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1120, 1129 (1969).
131. Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1120-1 (1969).
132. Id. at 1132.
133. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 499 (1954), it was stated: "ETihe
a condition over which he has no control. 4 An example is Robin-
son v. Californial3 5 where the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a state act which punished as a crime the possibly involun-
tary status of narcotics addiction. 1 36  The involuntary status of
illegitimacy also results in some "penalty" under state law. 1 '
VI. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT APPLiED To LABINE
When the Supreme Court held in Labine v. Vincent that a
state may limit the inheritance rights of an illegitimate child, it was
stated that ". . . there is nothing in the vague generalties of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses ... ,,l88 which would
compel a contrary conclusion. Evidently, the certainty of the ma-
jority that the fourteenth amendment had no application under the
facts of Labine is the reason no fourteenth amendment analysis
is given to support its holding. Unfortunately, there appears little
other analysis to support the holding.139 The majority simply
stated that
the power to make rules to establish, protect, and
strengthen family life in Louisiana by a man dying there is
committed by the Constitution of the United States and
the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that State.1
40
The dissent in Labine properly answered the majority's statement:
[N]o one questions Louisiana's power to pass inheritance
laws. Surely the Court cannot be saying that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is inappli-
concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." Id.
134. In Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct 1017 (1971), the dissenting opinion
cited the lower court's holding that discrimination against an illegitimate
child supported two state interests. First, punishment of the child might
encourage the parents to marry. Id. at 1029. Of interest here is the "zone
of privacy" concept in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Here,
the Court would not permit governmental intrusion into the sexual affairs
of consenting adults. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct at 1029-30. Second, the
state court found disinheritance of an illegitimate child would serve the
state's interest in stability of land titles. Id. at 1030 n.30. But, this state in-
terest was inapplicable in Labine where the father publicly acknowledged
illegitimate child as his own. Id.
Also, to deny a right because of the stigma of legitimacy can be char-
acterized as a form of a bill of attainder. Smith v. King, 392 U.S. 309, 336
n.5 (concurring opinion).
135. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
136. Similarly, chronic alcoholism is a disease which cannot be pun-
ished as a crime. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). Accord,
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A due process
violation may occur when a vagrancy statute imposes a penalty on un-
fortunate individuals. Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967);
Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.201 (Mass. 1967); Fenster v. Lery, 20
N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
137. See text at 401-2 infra.
138. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct 1017, 1021 (1971).
139. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
140. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1021 (1971).
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cable to subjects regulated by the States-that extraordi-
nary proposition would reverse 104 years of constitutional
adjudication under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. It is precisely state action which is subjected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to its restraints.
1 "
The dissent applied its own fourteenth amendment analysis to
the subject at hand.142 The dissent's view has been briefly consid-
ered earlier.143 Perhaps, it may be helpful to presently consider
an independent application of the fourteenth amendment to intes-
tacy legislation regarding the illegitimate child.
The appellants in Labine conceded that the state had great lati-
tude in making classifications where economic legislation is con-
cerned. 144 The reasonableness test was not argued. The appellants
drew an analogy between illegitimacy and "suspect" classifica-
tions.143 Such an approach would doubtlessly require strong justi-
141. Id. at 1025-26.
142. Id. at 1027-31.
143. See text at p. 389-91 supra.
144. Brief for Amicus Curiae and American Civil Liberties Union at 2,
Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct 1017 (1971).
145. Brief for Amicus Curiae, and Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law at 4, and Brief for Amicus Curiae, and American Civil Liberties Un-
ion at 3-6, Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017 (1971). The latter brief states:
The illegitimate child is claiming a "fundamental right or lib-
erty" or "a basic civil right of man."1 The child's interest in a
legal relationship with its father goes far beyond economics, al-
though it has economic incidents of which inheritance is one. The
child's claim centers on his father and extends to his second-class
status in our society-a society in which illegitimacy is a "psychic
catastrophe" 2 and in which recovery in tort is granted for a false
allegation of illegitimacy.3 Indeed, the psychological effect of the
stigma of bastardy upon its victim4 is comparable to the damag-
ing psychological effects upon the victims of racial discrimination.
The analogy to racial discrimination goes deeper. Although
illegitimacy, on its face, seems to be a neutral criterion, it actually
operates far more severely upon Negroes as a class than it does
upon whites. First, disproportionately more black children than
white children are born out of wedlock. The black illegitimacy
rate recently stood at a national average of 29.4 percent, whereas
the white rate stood at 4.9 percent. U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT,
March 30, 1970 at 30. This means that our law of illegitimacy has
the effect of denying more than one in four black children a legal
relationship with its father. Second, a far higher percentage of
white illegitimates than black illegitimates find parents through
adoption. The white adoption rate has been estimated to be 70 per-
cent whereas the black adoption rate ranges between 3 and 5 per-
cent. Bureau of Public Assistance, U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Illegitimacy and its Impact on the Aid to
Dependent Children Program 35-36 (1960); cf. Hylton, Trends in
Adoption, 1958-1962, 44 Child Welfare 377 (1965). This means that
an overwhelming percentage of children affected by laws discrimi-
nating on the basis of illegitimacy are black-and it is thus no coin-
cidence that the children involved in Levy and in this case are
black. In the brief for the N.A.A.C.P. LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCA-
TIONAL FUND, INC., AND NATIONAL OFFICE FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE
fication for the intestacy legislation under view if the analogy
were permitted. It may, however, be appropriate to apply the
"rational" equal protection test to intestacy legislation regarding
INDIGENT as Amici Curiae at 20, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968), this matter was illustrated pointedly:
Applying the national percentage on white adoptions
(70%) and non-white adoptions (4%) to the 1965 Louisi-
ana illegitimacy figures (1,158 white, 8,276 Negro); only
347 white children remain unadopted, whereas 7,945 Negro
children remain unadopted. This means that 95.8 percent
of all persons affected by the operation of the Louisiana
Wrongful Death Act are Negroes. For all practical pur-
poses this means that the criterion of illegitimacy as used
under the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act is synonymous
with a racial classification.
In this light it is plain that the case should be governed by
the standard set forth in Shapiro. Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 71 (1968), where the Court termed the criterion of illegiti-
macy 'invidious" and spoke of the "intimate, familial relationship
between [an illegitimate] child and his own mother.
I The illegitimate's demand for relief from discrimination has
gained world-wide recognition as a basic human right. In Janu-
ary, 1967, a subcommission of the Commission on Human Rights
of the United Nations adopted a statement on "General Principles
on Equality and Non-Discrimination in Respect of Persons Born
Out of Wedlock" which demands that "every person, once his filia-
tion has been established, shall have the same legal status as a per-
son born in wedlock." Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human
Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Study of
Discrimination against Persons Born out of Wedlock: General
Principles on Equality and Non-Discrimination in Respect of Per-
sons Born out of Wedlock, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4 Sub. 2/L 453 (13
Jan. 1967).
2 "In the case of illegitimate birth the child's reactions to life
are bound to be completely abnormal .... To be fatherless is
hard enough, but to be fatherless with the stigma of illegitimate
birth is a psychic catastrophe." Fodor, Emotional Trauma Result-
ing From Illegitimate Birth, 54 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY AND PSY-
CHIATRY 381 (1945).
3 The following is an abbreviated list of defamatory epithets
compiled in a leading text-book on torts: ". . . immoral or un-
chaste, or 'queer' . . . a coward, a drunkard, a hypocrite, a liar, a
scoundrel, a crook, a scandalmonger, an anarchist, a skunk, a bas-
tard, a ennuch . . . because all of these things obviously tend to
affect the esteem in which he is held by his neighbors." Prosser,
Torts, 757-58 (3rd ed. 1964).
4 In Jenkins, An Experimental Study of the Relationship of
Legitimate and Illegitimate Birth Status to School and Personal and
Social Adjustment of Negro Children, 64 AM. J. SocIoLoy 169
(1958), the author investigated whether there were significant dif-
ferences in the "adjustment" of legitimate and illegitimate Negro
school children. All children in the (unfortunately rather small)
sample were recipients of Aid to Dependent Children's funds and
otherwise lived in comparable economic and social circumstances.
"Adjustment" was considered to be reflected in I.Q., age-grade
placement, school absences, academic grades, teacher's rating, and
personal and social adjustment as measured by the California test
of personality. Jenkins reported that:
"Two primary patterns emerged in this study. First,
the legitimate children rated higher in every area except
school absences ...
The second discernible pattern was that the older
group of illegitimate children consistently made a poorer
showing than the younger group, in comparison with the le-
gitimate children. A possible explanation for this is that,
as these children grow older and are able to internalize
fully the concept of illegitimacy and as they become in-
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the illegitimate child.146 It will be remembered that in Levy v.
Louisiana147 the opinion did approach a test whether the classifi-
cation of illegitimacy bore a rational relation to the purpose of the
Louisiana wrongful death act. The purpose of wrongful death
legislation is to protect minors from loss of benefits had the par-
ent lived. Levy held that the tortfeasors should be responsible
for such loss regardless of whether the offsprings are legitimate.
14
In the Labine setting it could be argued that denying an illegitimate
child inheritance from his father can be justified. Such a result
bears a rational relationship to the state policy of deterring illegiti-
mate births or, conversely, encouraging the marital state. 49 A
soaring illegitimacy rate, however, argues to the contrary. 150 It is
not rational to presume non-married parents will conform to desired
social conduct before having illicit sexual conduct. The parents
are not concerned that a potential child will share the burden of
discriminatory state law.15
Even if the reasonableness of a state policy of encouraging
marriage were accepted, it is still not permissible to punish the in-
creasingly aware of their socially inferior status, their ad-
justment to self and society may become progressively less
satisfactory." Id. at 173.
146. The majority in Labine did not ground its result on any equal pro-
tection or due process analysis. It was stated, however, that ". . . even if
we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the Louisiana intestate succes-
sion statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's
interest in promoting family life and of directing the deposition of property
left within the State." Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1019 n.6 (1971).
The dissent in Labine would similarly hold that the state intestate
scheme is not supportable under a "rational basis" standard. Therefore, the
dissent was not compelled to consider whether illegitimacy is a "suspect"
classification which requires stronger justification to support it. Id. at 1027
n.19.
147. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
148. Id.
149. In re Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. App. 1969). See also Stra-
han v. Strahan, 304 F. Supp. 40, 42 (W.D. La. 1969). In Minor v. Young, 149
La. 583, 589, 89 So. 757, 759 (1921), the court stated that the reason local
law limits the right of inheritance of an illegitimate child ". . . is not to pun-
ish the off-spring of those contravening . . . rules of morality, but to raise
a warning barrier before the transgressor, prior to the act, of the conse-
quences of his conduct; in other words, like all other penal laws, they seek
to prevent rather than revenge."
150. Deterring illegitimacy may be a valid state goal. 'But if the means
to achieve goal are ineffective, then the means are not reasonable. Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). In 1950 the number of ille-
gitimate births was 141,000 or 3.9% of the population. In 1967 the number
was 318,100 which was 9.0% of the population. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1969).
151. It is doubtful that any fair connection lies between the child's
discriminatory legal treatment, and the statute's purpose of promoting fav-
orable sexual conduct through marriage of the parents. Knause, supra note
15, at 347.
nocent child for the wrongful conduct of parents.1 2 In Levy, it
was "invidious" to discriminate against the illegitimate child be-
cause ". . . no action, conduct, or demeanor of (the illegitimate
children) is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
mother."153  Such state action has been characterized as "... a
form of bill of attainder."'
154
A second purpose of intestacy legislation which denies inheri-
tance to the illegitimate child is the state policy underlying intes-
tacy legislation in fairly distributing intestate property. It has been
stated, however, that "[a] t minimum, Levy establishes that a state
cannot decide constitutionally that illegitimate children are less
deserving merely because of their condition of birth."'15
If "presumed intent" were a third plausible purpose of intes-
tacy legislation, then the question is raised whether state law
should be allowed to enforce private prejudice. Arguably, a state
should not necessarily presume a discriminatory intent by the fa-
ther of an illegitimate child. If a father intends to exclude an ille-
gitimate from sharing in his estate, the father has the simple alter-
native of providing for this result by will.s 6 But, in point of fact,
the father of an illegitimate probably does not want the child to
share in the father's estate. Whether the state should enforce this
prejudice in the form of intestacy legislation is another question.
This argument would rest on Shelly v. Kraemer'5 7 where the Su-
preme Court held that equal protection would not permit state en-
forcement of private covenants which restricted ownership of land
to caucasions.
The presumed intent theory has a further constitutional in-
firmity. The presumption that the father would desire to exclude
an illegitimate child as an heir is probably grounded on a further
152. See rotes 134-6 supra and accompanying text.
153. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
154. Smith v. King, 392 U.S. 309, 336 n.5 (1968) (concurring opinion).
155. Gray, supra note 15, at 24.
156. Knause, supra note 15, at 355. See also Knause, Protection For The
Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 502 (1967):
It should be noted that "freedom of disposition" would not be af-
fected if the presumption against the illegitimate were eliminated,
since the father would be free to disinherit the illegitimate child
by will, as he is now free to do with respect to his illegitimate
child.
In Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ii. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 851 (1963), the court
permitted an action against a father for fathering an illegitimate child.
Quare whether this example ". . . lends further support to the conclusion
that the father's choice to confer upon or withhold from his extra-marital
offspring a legitimate status is not a reasonable criterion on which the state
may base a classification." Knause, Equal Protection For The Illegitimate,
65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 497 (1967). See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying
text.
157. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This argument was advanced to the Labine
Court. Brief of Amicus Curiae, and Center On Social Welfare Policy Law at
6, Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct 1017 (1971).
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presumption: an illegitimate child does not usually have an actual
living relationship with the father similar to the legitimate child.
Stated differently, unlike the legitimate child, the illegitimate child
is often not dependent on the father for support. Such a view is
under-inclusive. It does not consider the illegitimate child who
does share a living relationship with the father. The view is also
over-inclusive. It does not consider the legitimate child who does
not share a relationship with his father. The legitimate child bene-
fits under intestacy legislation while the illegitimate child is gen-
erally excluded as an heir. 5 8
Even if the intestacy legislation under view would be sustain-
able under a "rational" test, the task is far more difficult if a classi-
fication of illegitimacy is "suspect."159 Illegitimacy has been lik-
ened to racial or ancestry classifications which are "constitutionally
suspect." 160 In Hirabayashi v. United States T16 it was stated that
".. . distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality." 162 Such a classification
is based solely on prejudice for which there is no constitutionau jus-
tification. 16 3
The appellants in Labine strongly argued that an analogy be-
tween the illegitimate and a minority race existed because both
groups suffer widespread social and psychological discrimination.'
64
Furthermore, there was a basic civil right in the illegitimate child's
right to a family relationship with his father.
165
The analogy between the prejudice accorded racial classifica-
158. Knause, Protection For The Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. R-v. 477, 495
(1967).
159. See note 145 supra. A state may claim certain local interests are
being protected by an arguably discriminatory statute. But, in determining
whether the equal protection clause is applicable, the facts and circum-
stances behind the state law will be considered, as well as the interests of
those persons disadvantaged by the law. Kramer v. Union Free School
District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). Prejudice is the ultimate basis of dis-
crimination against both the illegitimate child and the member of a certain
race. By itself, history of discrimination should not be justification to sup-
port a law. Compare In re Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1969)
with Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1031 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
160. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
161. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
162. Id. at 100.
163. See note 159 supra.
164. See note 145 supra.
165. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1027 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968), the Court tended to character-
ize wrongful death recovery as a basic civil right which ". .. involved the
intimate familial relationship between a child and his own mother."
tions and the illegitimate is attractive. And, again, due process
plays a role. rn any such classification, there is a loss of benefit
solely because of a condition of birth over which the innocent child
has no control. 16 6 Of interest is Oyama v. Californioa6 7 where the
Supreme Court struck down harsh state procedural burdens im-
posed on a child who sought to prove land title where the addi-
tional burden resulted solely because the child's father was an alien
ineligible for citizenship.
If illegitimacy is a "suspect" classification, then only a "compel-
ling state interest" will save an arguably discriminatory state stat-
ute. Perhaps, then, a state intestacy statute which excludes the
illegitimate child can survive a "balancing" test.1 68 Is there a state
objective which outweighs the policy behind an intestate statute
which discriminates against a "suspect" classification? The state
court in Labine laid great importance on maintaining the certainty
of land titles, and also the uncertainties which would result from
false claims of parentage. 169 Under the Labine facts, the father had
acknowledged the child as his own.' 70 Only absence of compliance
with a formality of state law excluded the child as an heir to his fa-
ther.1 7' The only other heirs to the estate were collateral relatives.
Certainly, where there is proof of paternity, as in Labine, there is
no "compelling" state interest to justify exclusion of the child as an
heir because of a fear of false claims by the child to the estate.
17 2
Where paternity is not already established, there is still reason
to doubt whether certainty of land titles and discouragement of
false paternity claims should be sufficient reason to uphold the in-
testacy legislation which is being considered. Even a valid substan-
tial governmental purpose should not be upheld where there are
basic rights involved and a more narrow means is available to
achieve the same end.1 78 If the state wishes to encourage mar-
riage, it need not punish the innocent child which results from an
illicit relationship. It can impose burdens directly upon the par-
ents, rather than the illegitimate child.' 7 4 Also, if proof of patern-
ity is the primary state interest, along with the question of false
166. See notes 134-6 supra and accompanying text.
167. 332 U.S. 633 (1968).
168. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
170. Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017 (1971).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 4350.
173. See note 119 supra.
174. More direct application of the laws has been suggested in the form
of fornication acts and tax incentives for marriage. Knause, Protection For
The Illegitimate, 65 McH. L. REv. 477, 495 (1967). This suggestion, how-
ever, may eventually conflict with an expanding "zone of privacy" concept
which raised its head in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). If
sexual conduct between unmarried consenting adults were eliminated as a
crime, other impositions would have to be devised to promote the states'
interest in marriage. One suggestion is to give the illegitimate child a
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claims, then there is presently means available to prove paternity
to some degree. 175 Litigation following Levy has considered
whether equal protection will permit a degree of proof to allow an
illegitimate to claim heirship. 1 6 Some reasonable certainty of pa-
ternity is uniformly required. 17 Since protective safeguards are
available, it is questionable whether an illegitimate should be un-
duly excluded as an heir.178 Additionally, state legislatures could
consider a proposal now available in Minnesota which provides for
initiation of a proof of paternity proceeding by a state administra-
tor.179 Heirship could then follow a successful administratively
sponsored paternity action.
value only interest in the estate of his father. Or, give legitimate heirs the
option to purchase undivided shares of the illegitimates in the estate. Note,
TuL. L. R. 640, 645 n.30 (1970).
175. Bloodtests and related questions of proof are considered at length
in Knause, Equal Protection For The Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477
(1967). See also Knause, supra note 15, at 349-51, and Note, TiL. L. R. 640,
647-8 (1970). Evidently, simply because there is a question of proof does
not necessarily require denial of a right of inheritance from the father. Cf.
Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. 391 U.S. 68, 76 (1968). There, it was
argued that a mother of an illegitimate child should not recover for his
wrongful death. This would encourage fraudulent claims of motherhood.
But, Glona stated that this was a problem regarding "burden of proof,"
which did not apply where the ". . . the claimant is plainly the mother,
." Id. But, the court will not provide proof of kinship in death where
there was none in life. Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198, 201 (Miss. 1971).
176. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
177. Of interest is Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 413 F.2d 509 (5th
Cir. 1969). Here, the court upheld the Louisiana presumption of paternity
from constitutional attack.
178. This is a due process argument. See note 119 supra.
179. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1959).
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public welfare when
notified of a woman who is delivered of an illegitimate child, or
pregnant with child likely to be illegitimate when born, to take
care that the interests of the child are safe-guarded, that appropri-
ate steps are taken to establish his paternity, and that there is se-
cured for him the nearest possible approximation to the care, sup-
port, and education that he would be entitled to if born of lawful
marriage.
See also Knause, supra note 15, at 350 n.48:
A problem with efforts to involve the father is the potential
clash with the child's possible interest in being adopted by suit-
able outsiders. This potential conflict can be alleviated or avoided
if the child's best interests are considered decisive. Consider, for
example, a provision such as the following [adapted from Krause,
Bringing the Bastard Into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L. Riv, 829, 837 (1966)]:
If a child born out of wedlock has not been legitimated or
if his right of support has not been determined in a pa-
ternity action or if he has not been adopted in accordance
with the law of adoption, within a period of [one] year
beginning with the child's birth, a proceeding to determine
paternity shall be brought without delay by [insert name
VII. CONCLUSION
There appears to be substantial difficulty in upholding discrim-
inatory intestacy legislation even under the traditional equal pro-
tection standard applied to economic legislation. There are simply
too many impediments to rationality when illegitimates are ex-
cluded as heirs. Moreover, illegitimacy may be a "suspect" classi-
fication. No state interest seems to compel further discrimina-
tion against the illegitimate child. This is especially true where the
purposes of discriminatory intestacy legislation can be achieved by
less drastic legislation. If there is a legitimate state interest to ex-
clude the illegitimate child as an heir, then Labine is not authority
for such a result. That opinion does not provide any satisfactory
answer to the issue raised in that case. Finally, there is a total ab-
sence of rationality where the innocent illegitimate child is punished
for the acts of a parent.
What has not been considered is the weight of centuries-old
prejudice against the illegitimate child which now exists in many
state laws. Perhaps a rational dissection of discriminatory legisla-
tion is not adequate. Certainly, had Labine reached an opposite
result, it would have been contrary to popular opinion. Labine,
however, does not require local courts to limit the inheritance rights
of the illegitimate child. Local courts as well as legislatures are
still free to determine the construction of descent and distribution
statutes.1 80 Hopefully, enlightened courts will replace prejudice
of public authority] on behalf of the child. The court shall
dismiss the action if, on the basis of the available evidence,
the court is satisfied that the proceeding to determine pa-
ternity would not serve the child's best interests.
180. Brief of Amicus Curiae, and American Civil Liberties Union at 13-
15, Labine v. Vincent, 91 S.Ct. 1017 (1971):
[A] development of considerable interest is that at its meet-
ing in Dallas in 1969, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Probate Code, which
gives the illegitimate child inheritance rights equal to that of his
legitimate brother. It provides as follows:
§ 2-109:
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship
of parent and child must be established to determine suc-
cession by, through or from a person,
(a) an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent
and not of the natural parents except that adoption of a
child by the spouse of a natural parent shall have no effect
on the relationship between the child and his natural par-
ents.
(b) In cases not covered by (a), a person born out of wed-
lock is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of
the father, provided:
(1) The natural parents participated in a marriage
ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even
though the attempted marriage is void; or
(2) The paternity is established by an adjudication
before the death of the father or is established there-
after by clear and convincing proof, except that the pa-
ternity established under this subparagraph (2) is in-
effective to quality the father or his kindred to inherit
from or through the child unless the father has openly
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with reason and apply a construction to descent and distribution
statutes which will remove the disabilities of the illegitimate child
from inheriting from his father.
treated the child as his, and has not refused to support
the child.
COMMENT: The definition of "child" and "parent" in
Section 1-201 incorporates the meanings established by this
section, thus extending them for all puroses of the Code.
Years earlier, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has gone on record in § 1 of the Uniform
Paternity Act, 9B Uniform Laws Ann. 155 (Supp. 1964), in favor
of full equality between legitimate children in terms of their
right of paternal support. Currently, the National Conference's
Committee on a Uniform Legitimacy Act is drafting legislation
that will carefully regulate the important question of ascertain-
ment of paternity and reaffirm the equality of rights of support
and inheritance previously promised by the Conference. Uniform
Legitimacy Act, First Tentative Draft, National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, June 1, 1970.
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